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NON OPERATOR VERSUS OPERATOR AND OTHER OIL AND GAS
OPERATIONS RELATED CASES

A.

Court Allows Operator to Recoup Mistaken Over-payment of
ProductionProceeds

In Marlin Oil Corp. v. Lurie, the court was presented with the operator's mistaken overpayment of $135,625.35 in production proceeds to
Lurie.2 Marlin was the operator of the subject well, and Lurie owned
a 3.071349% working interest and a 2.36502% net revenue interest in
the well.' Lurie had been in a non-consent penalty recoupment status
due to his election to not participate in a rework operation.4 After
recovering the penalty, Marlin put Lurie back in pay status.' However, due to an accounting error, Marlin overstated Lurie's interest in
the well as a 19.006109% net revenue interest (instead of 2.36502%).6
The check stub sent to Lurie showed the inflated and mistaken net
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Marlin Oil Corp. v. Lurie, 417 F. App'x 740, 741 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
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revenue interest.' Lurie contacted Marlin to ask if the "amount" of
the check was correct, without making any reference to the overstated
net revenue interest.' The operator's personnel responded that the
"amount" was correct.9 Marlin did not discover the error and
monthly over-payment until almost three years later. 10
In defending against Marlin's suit to recover the overpayment,
Lurie asserted that the computer error was either known or should
have been known by Marlin, so that there was no mistake in the overpayment." The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that even if
Marlin should have discovered its mistake sooner, that fact did not bar
Marlin's right to receive restitution from Lurie." The court found
that Marlin was entitled to restitution of the $135,625.35 plus interest
on that amount.' 3 The court further found that Marlin was entitled to
withhold future payments to Lurie until Marlin was repaid in full.14
Court Finds that District Court Lawsuit for Fraudand Other
Torts did not Constitute a CollateralAttack on Orders of
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
The case of Samson Resources Company v. Newfield Exploration
Mid-Continent, Inc. involved an application of Newfield to force-pool
the working interest rights of Samson and other owners in Section
28.'" Samson elected to participate in the proposed well as a costbearing working interest owner "to the full extent of its interest."' 6
At the time of that election, Samson thought it owned only 17.78
acres, and it believed that an oil and gas lease covering an additional
seventy net acres had recently expired due to the absence of the
timely commencement of a well on the lease.' 7 However, Newfield's
early commencement of the well at issue in the pooling action had,
without the knowledge of Samson, maintained the additional seventy
leasehold acres in force and effect.'s
Samson sent Newfield a check in the amount of $285,999.63 for the
estimated well costs attributable to the 17.78 acres Samson thought it
owned.' A Newfield landman treated Samson's payment as a payment to secure Samson's election to participate to the extent of all its
B.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 741-42.
9. Id. at 742.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 744.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 745-46.
15. Samson Res. Co. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent, Inc., 281 P.3d 1278,
1280 (Okla. 2012).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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interest, and the landman did not compare the prepayment amount
with the 87.78-acre interest Newfield believed was covered by Samson's participation election. 2 0 Approximately one month later,
Newfield noticed the under-payment and advised Samson that it had
underpaid the well costs and that Samson's election to participate with
87.78 acres would require a prepayment of $1,411,982.45.21 Samson
responded that its intent was to participate with only its 17.78-acre
interest.22
Samson filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the "Commission") asking it to determine that Samson's
election was limited to 17.78 acres.23 The Commission determined
that Samson had elected to participate to the full extent of its 87.78acre interest in the unit and that Samson had made a unilateral mistake as to the size of its interest.24 The court of appeals ultimately
affirmed that ruling.2 5
While Samson's appeal was pending before the court of appeals,
Samson sued Newfield in the state district court alleging actual fraud,
deceit, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, constructive
fraud, and breach of duty as operator.2 6 Samson additionally alleged
that Newfield's actions amounted to extrinsic fraud on the Commission, rendering the pooling order invalid as to Samson's seventy-acre
interest in the lease that Samson thought had expired.2 ' The district
court dismissed Samson's petition on the basis that Samson's claims
were an impermissible collateral attack on a final order of the Commission.I The court of appeals affirmed.29
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the district court and vacated the court of appeals's ruling, although it did agree that the Commission's order could not be challenged in district court based upon
allegations of extrinsic fraud. 0 However, the court found that Samson's claims for actual and punitive damages were private claims that
sounded in tort and were beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission,
and that the district court was the proper tribunal for Samson to bring
the above-described claims."
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1281-82.
25. Id. at 1281.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1281. Samson alleged that Newfield concealed from Samson the dirt
work, which held the seventy-acre lease in continued force and effect, and that
Newfield had stated in its Commission papers that it proposed to drill a well on the
subject property when, in fact, the well had already been commenced. Id. at 1280.
28. Id. at 1279.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1282-83.
31. Id. at 1283.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/26
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A.

AND

523

GAS CONTRACTS, TRANSACTIONS, AND
TITLE MATTERS

Sellers and Buyers Disagreeas to Whether the Deed Conveyed a
One-Half Mineral Interest, or Only a One-Fourth
Mineral Interest

The controversy in Combs v. Sherman involved the interpretation
of a deed." The two sellers held joint ownership of a fifty-six-acre
tract of land.3 3 In a 1993 letter, they offered to sell the property to
the Rowtons "for $175.00 per acre with one-quarter mineral rights going to the buyer."3 4 The letter contained a "P.S." stating that the two
sellers "will retain 3/4 of the minerals and sell 1/4 with the 56 acres."
Each of the sellers executed an identical, but separate, joint tenancy
warranty deed in favor of the Rowtons. 3 6 The description of land and
reservation language in each deed referred to certain described lands
and stated that those lands contained
56 acres, more or less, as the case may be, LESS AND EXCEPT an
undivided 3/4ths interest in and to the oil, gas and other minerals
lying in and under the property, which are specifically reserved by
Grantor herein, it being the intent of Grantor herein to convey to
Grantee herein, an undivided 114th mineral interest.3 7

In 1999, the Rowtons sold their interest in the property to the
Combs (the "buyers"). 38 The buyers then leased their mineral interests." In 2007, the sellers sold their reserved mineral interests to Legacy Royalty.4 0
A disagreement arose between the parties as to the relative ownership of the minerals underlying the fifty-six-acre tract. 4 1 So, in 2009,
the buyers sued the sellers claiming ownership of a 1/2 mineral interest.4 2 The sellers asserted that they had conveyed to the Rowtons
only a 1/4th mineral interest.4 3 The trial court granted judgment in
favor of the buyers finding that they owned a 1/2 mineral interest in
the property.4 4 In support of that conclusion, the trial court cited the
"Duhig rule" 45 under which a grantor can, under certain circum32. Combs v. Sherman, 267 P.3d 150 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 151.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 151-52; see also Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878
(Tex. 1940); Birmingham v. McCoy, 358 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1960).
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stances, be estopped from claiming "that the deed conveyed a less estate than grantor's complete ownership."' The sellers appealed.47
The buyers argued on appeal that each of the two deeds reserved
3/4ths of the mineral interests and conveyed the remaining 1/4th of
each seller's mineral interest and that, because 1/4th plus 1/4th equals
1/2, the sellers conveyed 1/2 of their mineral interest. The court of
appeals rejected this contention for several reasons.
First, the court found that the buyers' reasoning was flawed."o
Under the buyers' logic, the sellers reserved 6/4ths or 150% of what
they owned, which was mathematically impossible."
Second, the buyers' rationale was found to have ignored the essence
of joint tenancy ownership in which the two sellers owned the property in "equal shares."" Each of the sellers could convey as much of
that seller's share as desired but no more than that." "Buyers received one quarter of each 'equal share.' That is not the same thing as
two quarters of the whole. In short, each [seller] here owned an undivided half of the entire estate, and each sold 1/4 of her interest." 5 4
Third, the court found that the cases cited with respect to the Duhig
rule were distinguishable from the facts in the case for a variety of
reasons.5 5
Finally, the court found that there was nothing in the deeds and
nothing in the other evidence that indicated any intent on the part of
the sellers to divest themselves of more than a quarter interest in the
minerals." The court reversed the district court's decision and held
that the buyers acquired only a 1/4th mineral interest in the
property.
B.

Court ConstruesAmbiguous Assignment and Determines the
Scope of the Rights Conveyed
The case of Citation 2002 Investment Partnershipv. Apache Corp.
presented a quiet title action that involved the interpretation of an
assignment of oil and gas leases that was delivered in 1990 by Sun
Operating in favor of Mobil Oil.s8 The assignment included the Jef46. Combs, 267 P.3d at 151-52.
47. Id. at 150.
48. Id. at 152.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 152-53.
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 154.
58. Citation 2002 Inv. P'ship v. Apache Corp., No. 108,456, 11 1, 2 (Okla. Civ.
App. Feb. 3, 2012) (Okla. Pub. Legal Research Sys.), http://oklegal.onenet.net/oklegal-cgi/isearch.
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ferson Lease that was at issue in the suit." The language in the assignment that described the Jefferson Lease included, in part, the
following words:
The following Oil & Gas Leases are hereby assigned INSOFAR
AND ONLY INSOFAR as they contribute to the Graham Deese
Unit Phase II as established by that certain Plan of Unitization and
further as said unit was approved and granted under that certain
Oklahoma Corporation Commission Order No. 91401 dated 6-7-72
and as amended by Order No. 301376 dated 8-5-86.60
After describing the internal company lease number, the lessor,
lessee, date, book and page of recordation, and the tracts of land covered, the assignment then added the following words:
LESS AND EXCEPT the Arbuckle Formation as found in the Neustadt 1-25 at a subsurface depth of 9,864 ft. down to 10,152 ft. 6 1
In 1993, Sun delivered an assignment of the Jefferson Lease to
Apache that purported to assign that lease:
INSOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR as said oil and gas lease covers
and applies to depths below the base of the Graham Deese Unit [in
certain described lands]. 62
Citation succeeded to the position of Mobil under the first assignment." Apache and the other appellees were the owners of the rights
conveyed under the second assignment.'
In 2009, Citation filed the present quiet title action against Apache
and the other appellees, asserting ownership of all rights in the Jefferson Lease except for the Arbuckle formation." The Apache group
pointed to the terms of Sun's assignment to Mobil that conveyed only
the portion of the Jefferson Lease that "contributed to" the Graham
Deese Unit Phase II, and they argued that the assignment did not include any depths below the Deese formation.66 The Apache group
argued that the Jefferson Lease only contributed to the Graham
Deese Unit Phase II to the extent it granted the right to produce oil
and gas from the Deese formation.6 7
Citation asserted that the reference to the Graham Deese Unit
Phase II in Sun's assignment to Mobil did not limit the depths conveyed to Mobil." Citation pointed to the later language in the assignment excluding the Arbuckle formation as supporting its
59. Id. 1 2.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id. 3.
Id. 2.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. 4.
Id. I 6.
Id.

68. Id. 5.
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interpretation. 69 Those words in the assignment would have been unnecessary if the Apache group's interpretation were correct, since the
Arbuckle was outside the Deese Formation."o The Apache group replied that the Arbuckle language was, at worst, redundant in relation
to the depth limits already imposed with the earlier reference to the
Deese Unit."
The case proceeded to a bench trial, and each side introduced lay
and expert testimony to support the opposing interpretations of Sun's
assignment to Mobil." In ruling in favor of the Apache group, the
district court noted in part as follows: first, the district court found
that the assignment was ambiguous, and it also found that the term
"contribute," as used in Sun's assignment to Mobil, appeared to be
synonymous with the term "apply.""
Second, in addressing the inconsistency between (a) the contention
that the assignment to Mobil covered only the Deese Formation and
(b) the inclusion by Sun of words in the assignment that excluded and
reserved the Arbuckle formation, the district court stated the
following:
After having read the assignment many times, the Court has
reached the following conclusion: If I conveyed my backyard and
specifically excluded my driveway (which is in the front yard), I still
would only have conveyed my backyard. I would not have conveyed my house. 74
The court concluded that the intent of the assignment "was to convey
only that portion of the lease which is included in the Graham Deese
Unit.... If Sun and Mobil had intended for the instrument to convey
all formations except for the Arbuckle, it could have done so in very
simple language." 7
On appeal, the court of appeals cited the legal standards that need
to be met in order to reverse a trial court's ruling regarding the interpretation of an ambiguous contract.76 The appellate court concluded
that the trial court's judgment was not against the clear weight of the
evidence or contrary to law. It affirmed the decision of the district
court.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. 1 6.
Id. 1 7, 8.
Id. 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. 12.
Id.
Id. 1 14.
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III. SURFACE USE, SURFACE DAMAGES, SURFACE DAMAGES AcT,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL

A.

CASES

Court Rules that the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Departmentof
Transportationis not Exempt From the Provisions of the
Oklahoma Surface Damages Act

The case of JMA Energy Co., LLC v. State of Oklahoma ex rel.
Department of Transportation presented the Oklahoma Department
of Transportation's ("DOT") appeal in proceedings that JMA brought
under the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act." The DOT moved to
dismiss JMA's surface damage appraisal action, asserting that sovereign immunity precluded the state from being sued unless such immunity had been waived by the state.'o The DOT argued that the
Surface Damages Act did not waive the immunity of the state.81 The
trial court rejected the DOT's contention, noting that the Surface
Damages Act explicitly exempts property held by an Indian, an Indian
tribe, or by the United States for an Indian tribe, but the Act does not
expressly exempt property owned by the state.8 2
The Oklahoma court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the district
court. In doing so, the court first found that Oklahoma's common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity has been abrogated, and the DOT
must now point to a specific statute to support its contention that it
has sovereign immunity from the provisions of the Surface Damages
Act.8 4 The court held that the Governmental Tort Claims Act only
establishes sovereign immunity as to torts.85 Finally, with regard to
the DOT's assertion that the Surface Damages Act does not by its
terms apply to state lands, the court noted that the legislature addressed the scope of lands exempted from that Act, and it could have
exempted state lands but chose only to exempt Indian lands under the
express provisions in the Act." The court concluded that the DOT is
not exempt from the provisions of the Surface Damages Act.87

79. JMA Energy Co. v.
Civ. App. 2012).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1055.
83. Id. at 1059.
84. Id. at 1056.
85. Id. at 1056-57.
86. Id. at 1058-59.
87. Id. at 1059.

State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 278 P.3d 1053, 1054 (Okla.
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B. Court Finds that the Corporation Commission Exceeded its
Jurisdiction When it Found that the Operator, who was the Subject
of Pending Civil Litigationfor Nuisance, Trespass, and Other
Claims, had Made "Reasonable Use" of the Surface
The case of Morgan v. CorporationCommission involved the Velma
Sims Sand (Vess) Unit in Stephens County, Oklahoma and certain
wells which the Morgans (the "landowners") contended had been
abandoned and had fallen into disrepair. In May 2007, the landowners sued Chevron for nuisance, trespass, and other claims." They asserted, among other claims, that Chevron had used more of the
surface than was reasonably necessary, and for a longer period of time
than was reasonably necessary, and had failed to properly maintain
the wells.89
After retaining experts to examine the unit in June 2009, Chevron
filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
seeking approval of a plan of remediation for the unit, involving the
cleaning up of debris and remediation of several of the wells and surrounding lands. 90 Chevron also asked that the Commission determine
whether its operations complied with the Commission's rules and regulations and "pose[d] no threat to the health, safety and welfare" of
the landowners and other Oklahoma citizens.91 The Commission held
a hearing on the merits of Chevron's application.
In November 2009, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a
report recommending that Chevron's remediation plan be approved.9 3
Chevron appealed, seeking to supplement the report with a finding
that Chevron's use of the land was "reasonable." 9 4 The matter was
remanded to the ALJ who issued a supplemental report in January
2010, which found in part that the testimony and exhibits "clearly
show Chevron has made reasonable use of the at issue surface
estate."95
The landowners did not appeal the initial and supplemental reports. 6 However, when the parties could not agree on the form of the
final order and their differences were presented to the ALJ for resolu88. Morgan v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 274 P.3d 832, 834 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 834-35.
91. Id. at 835. The court notes in its opinion that Chevron did not initially seek a
Commission finding as to the reasonableness of its use, but instead framed its application as a plan to remediate for purposes of public rights and safety: "Only in later
hearings before the AU and on appeal to the OCC did Chevron urge a finding that
its use of the surface was reasonable. The purpose of Chevron's insistence, admittedly, is to seek issue preclusion in the district court case based on the OCC's order."
Id. at 837.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 835.
96. Id.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/26
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tion, the ALJ ruled that the final order would be based on both the
original and supplemental reports.' The landowners appealed to the
Commission en banc.9" Chevron moved to strike the landowners' appeal.99 The ALJ and Appellate Referee both recommended that the
motion to strike be granted and that the landowners' motion to settle
the terms of the final order be denied.' 00 The Commission agreed and
0 The landowners filed
entered a final order in favor of Chevron.o'
suit, asserting that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction when it
determined that Chevron's use of the surface was reasonable.o 2
The Oklahoma court of appeals agreed with the landowners that
the Commission's final order exceeded its jurisdiction to the extent
that the Commission determined that Chevron's use of the surface
was reasonable.103 The court vacated the specified paragraphs of the
order that related to that determination.10 4 Since the landowners did
not challenge Chevron's plan of remediation, the other portions of the
order were affirmed.105
In reaching that ruling, the court noted that the right to reasonable
use of the surface is a right implied from the parties' oil and gas
lease. 0 6 Consequently, the dispute concerned the liability of one private individual or entity to another and thus, involved private rights
within the jurisdiction of the district courts rather than the
Commission. 0 7
The court rejected Chevron's contention that the landowners failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies by failing to appeal the AL's
two reports. 0 8 It found that the landowners' challenge to the jurisdiction of the Commission to act with respect to the appealed ruling involved a fundamental question that must be inquired into by the court
in every case, whether raised by a party or not (i.e., the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by the court sua sponte).10 9

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

837.
839.
838.
838-39.
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CONSERVATION COMMISSION RELATED CASES

A. Court Reviews CorporationCommission Order Finding
Landowner and Equipment Salvage Company Primarily
Liable for the Plugging of the Subject Well
The case of Hoover v. Boone Operating,Inc., involved an appeal by
a landowner and a salvage company of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission's interim order finding them to be primarily responsible
for plugging certain oil wells and finding the operator to be only secondarily liable for such plugging operations." 0
Hoover was the surface owner of the subject lands, and Boone had
operated several oil wells on the lands."' Based on the landowner's
observations regarding the condition of the well equipment, he believed that Boone had abandoned the wells." 2 Indeed, through the
course of the proceedings in this matter, the landowner claimed that
ownership of the well equipment had reverted to him because it had
been abandoned.1 1 3 So, by quitclaim conveyance, the landowner sold
the well equipment to the owner of a salvage company, which then
removed the well equipment.114 Neither the landowner nor the salvage company plugged any of the wells from which the equipment had
been removed."'
After learning that the landowner had sold the equipment and that
the salvage company removed it, Boone filed an application with the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission requesting that the Commission
find both the landowner and salvage company responsible for plugging the subject wells." 6 The operator alleged that it could no longer
economically operate the wells due to the actions of the landowner
and the salvage company." 7 The operator further asserted that the
two respondents had, by their actions, asserted dominion and control
over the wells without authority or permission and were thereby responsible for plugging the wells."s
The Administrative Law Judge found that the landowner, the salvage company, and the operator were "jointly and severally" liable for
plugging the wells." 9 All parties appealed to the Corporation Commission en banc.12 0 The Commission entered an interim order finding
the landowner and the salvage company to be primarily responsible
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Hoover v. Boone Operating, Inc., 274 P.3d 815, 816 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

115. Id.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for plugging the well, with the operator being secondarily liable.12 1
The landowner and the salvage company appealed.122
The court of appeals first addressed the question of whether the
Commission possessed the constitutional or statutory authority to declare a surface owner or equipment salvager responsible for plugging
a well.123 While Rule 165:10-11-3 of the Commission, dealing with the
duty to plug and abandon, refers to "working interest owners" and
"operators," the court found that the authority of the Commission to
hold any person (and not just the operator) liable for plugging, replugging, or repairing a well is a necessary part of the Commission's general authority to take action to prevent and prohibit waste and
pollution relating to activities under its jurisdiction. 12 4 The court next
found that the findings of the Commission were supported by substan-

tial evidence. 1 25

However, the court held that before the Commission could proceed
against "other responsible persons," the Commission must first promulgate rules and regulations which, at a minimum, provide criteria
for the determination of who is an "other responsible person" and the
criteria for assigning to "other responsible persons" primary, joint, or
secondary liability and responsibility.' 2 6 To the extent that there
should be unequal treatment of parties subject to the Commission's
rules, there must be a rational basis for the disparity in treatment.12 7
Since the Commission had not enacted such rules, the court concluded
that the Commission did not have authority to act.128 The court reversed the Commission's interim order. 2 9
One collateral procedural issue of interest is that, after the landowner and the salvage company's request for a stay of the Commission's order was denied both by the Commission and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, the landowner began plugging the well.13 0 The operator then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot.' However, the court
of appeals denied that motion, finding that "coerced compliance with
the conditions of an order is not tantamount to accepting the benefit
of a judgment, which acceptance waives the right of appeal."' 3 2 The
court noted that the landowner and salvage company might have be121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 817.
§ 165:10-11-3 (1999); Hoover, 274 P.3d at 818.
Hoover, 274 P.3d at 819.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id.
Id. at 816-17.
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come subject to an enforcement action for failure to comply, had they
taken no action, resulting in a situation of coerced compliance. 3 3
B. Court Reverses Trial Court Decision Invalidating in Parta
Forced Pooling Order that was Entered More Than 25 Years Earlier,
on the Basis of a Failureto Give PersonalNotice
In Indio Investments, Inc. v. Mesa Ridge Resources, Inc., the complex factual backdrop involved unleased mineral owners, a forced
pooling order, subsequent disputes as to the correct ownership of the
mineral rights, and ultimately, an attempt to invalidate the pooling
order as to certain mineral owners.13 4
The forced pooling proceedings occurred long ago, in 1980.'1s The
pooling application represented that the applicant had exercised due
diligence to locate each respondent."' The applicant filed an affidavit
with the Commission stating that it did not mail notice of the pooling
application to the respondent at issue in this lawsuit, and certain other
responsibilities, because "after the exercise of due diligence the
whereabouts of said parties or successors to their interests have not
been located.""'3 Publication notice 3was given, and proof of publication was filed with the Commission.' 1 s
In granting the pooling application on September 5, 1980, the Commission found in part that "notice has been given as required by law
and by Commission rules; that due diligence has been exercised to
find each Respondent; that a bona fide effort was made to reach an
agreement with each Respondent."' 39 The applicant subsequently
filed an affidavit with the Commission in September 1980 stating that
it did not mail a copy of the Commission's pooling order to the subject
respondent, and others, because "after the exercise of due diligence
the whereabouts of said parties or successors to their interests have

not been located."14 0

In the lawsuit that was filed in October 2006, the plaintiffs asserted
that the September 1980 forced pooling order was void as to certain
parties due to the lack of personal notice to their predecessor.141 The
trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and entered a summary judgment
for them. 4 2 The trial court stated that "[a] party must use reasonable
diligence and conduct a meaningful search of all reasonably available
133. Id. at 817.
134. Indio Invs., Inc. v. Mesa Ridge Res., Inc., No. 108,928 (Okla. Civ. App. Nov.
18, 2011) (Okla. Pub. Legal Research Sys.).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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sources at hand to locate and notify the record owner." 43 The court
found that the undisputed facts documented the conclusion that a cursory review of the records in the county where the record owner resided would have revealed the names and whereabouts of those
required to be notified.'" The successors to the applicant under the
pooling order appealed.14 5
The court of appeals described the issue presented as one of
whether, over twenty-five years after the pooling order was entered,
the assertion that the order was void for lack of personal notice and
personal jurisdiction constituted an impermissible collateral attack on
the pooling order.14 6 The court found that the order at issue was not
appealed and is now final.147 So a collateral attack would be permissible only to the limited extent of reviewing whether the Commission
had jurisdiction to enter the order.14 8 The court of appeals further
observed that "the trial court, and this Court on appeal, may not go
beyond the face of the OCC's proceedings and [may not] consider
extrinsic evidence to determine whether Oakland exercised due diligence in locating the record owner."149
Additionally, the court observed that, at the time the applicant filed
the 1980 force pooling proceedings, the Oklahoma statutes concerning
pooling actions only required publication notice. 50 It was only later
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court in subsequent cases held that publication notice was not reasonably calculated to provide actual knowledge of legal proceedings and was inadequate.' 5 1 Thus, to the extent
the trial court applied more-recent notice standards that had not been
adopted at the time of the subject pooling proceedings, it erred. 5 2
The face of the 1980 pooling proceedings established that the applicant complied with the applicable Oklahoma statutes. 5 3
Based upon the foregoing, the court of appeals concluded that the
present lawsuit constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the
pooling order, and it reversed the trial court's order.15 4

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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151.
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C. Court Affirms CorporationCommission Pooling Order that
Protects the Applicant/Operatorfrom Excessive Oil and Gas Lease
Burdens Created in Anticipation of the Pooling Action
The case of WN Operating,Inc. v. Terraco LLC involved an appeal
from a forced pooling order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission which designated WN Operating as the unit operator. 5 5 Viersen
owned mineral rights in the subject property.' 56 WN contacted Viersen concerning the proposed development of the property for oil and
gas purposes, but Viersen opposed having any well or production facilities located on its property."' When WN submitted a formal proposal to Viersen, Viersen executed an oil and gas lease in favor of
Terraco the very next day in apparent anticipation of WN filing a
forced pooling proceeding. 58 The new lease contained surface-use restrictions preventing drilling activity on the subject property, provided
for a 1/4th royalty and gave Terraco an option at payout to either increase the 1/4th royalty to 40% or convert it to a 50% working interest.'59 There was no evidence that Terraco paid Viersen anything for
the heavily-burdened oil and gas lease.'6 o
WN subsequently filed the present compulsory pooling proceeding
naming Terraco as a respondent.'16 After the hearing, the Commission granted the pooling application.16 2 With respect to the heavilyburdened oil and gas lease and working interest of Terraco, the Commission specifically found as follows:
The interest of Terraco, LLC is . . . subject to a non-arm's-length

overriding royalty and back-in that substantially reduces the net
revenue below a 75% net revenue interest. This overriding royalty
and back-in was made in contemplation of the pooling proceeding
and creates an excessive burden, for fair market appraisal as a
working interest. This Commission has the power to pierce through
this non-arm's-length transaction, in order to prevent waste and to
protect correlative rights by requiring Terraco, LLC to bear this excessive burden. Any burden on the Terraco, LLC interest exceeding a 1/4 total royalty shall be borne by Terraco, LLC and not be the
responsibility of WN Operating, Inc. 1
Terraco appealed.'6"
155. WN Operating, Inc. v. Terraco, LLC, No. 108,564,
18, 2011) (Okla. Pub. Legal Research Sys.).
156. Id. 2.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's pooling order.6 5
The court first rejected Terraco's assertion that there was insufficient
evidence to support the Commission's finding that its oil and gas lease
with Viersen was not an arm's-length transaction." The court noted
that the expert testimony presented at the hearing showed that the
lease was non-standard and did not reflect the fair market value for
leases in the area."' The lease was found to have created excessive
burdens and to have been made in contemplation of the pooling
proceedings.16 8
Terraco additionally argued that the Commission was without jurisdiction to rearrange contractual rights and duties of overriding royalty
interest owners and that it did not have authority to deem Terraco
liable for any burdens in excess of 1/4th. 1 69 The court overruled this
contention and found that the Commission had acted within its broad
discretion in determining what constitutes just and reasonable compensation to the owners of force-pooled interests.7 o
V. OTHER OIL

AND GAS CASES

A. Appellate Court Reverses District Court's Order Directing the
Release and Distribution of the Payments Deposited with the District
Court in an InterpleaderAction Since the Texas Judgment upon
which that Order was Based was Reversed on Appeal
In Williams Production Mid-Continent Co. v. Patton Production
Corp., a dispute had arisen between Anoco and Patton concerning
ownership of certain overriding royalty interests in gas wells operated
by Williams.' 71 When the ownership dispute led to litigation in Texas
between Anoco and Patton, Williams filed the present interpleader
action in May 2007 and began depositing the overriding royalty payments into the registry of the district court of Tulsa County. 172
On June 25, 2009, the court in the Texas case granted Patton's application for a "turnover order," which ordered Anoco to turn over to
Patton all of its interest in the funds held in the registry of the district
court of Tulsa County.17 3 Patton then filed a renewal of a prior unsuccessful motion with the Oklahoma court asking it to give full faith and
credit to the Texas judgment.17 4 Anoco objected on the grounds that
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
(Okla.
172.
173.
174.

Id. 7.
Id. 1 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. 6.
Id.
Williams Prod. Mid-Continent Co. v. Patton Prod. Corp., 277 P.3d 499, 500
Civ. App. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
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the Texas judgment was the subject of a pending appeal.'
The
Oklahoma court granted Patton's motion and directed that all the interpled funds be released to Patton and that Williams remit the future
overriding royalty payments to Patton.'7 6 Anoco appealed.17 ' During
the pendency of the appeal, the Texas court of appeals reversed the
Texas judgment that had been the basis of the Oklahoma court's order
for the release of the funds.17 a
In addressing the issues on appeal, the Oklahoma court of appeals
first observed that the Oklahoma court initially "did not err in granting judgment to Patton based upon the Texas decree."' 7 9 The appellate court further observed the following:
The Oklahoma court was constitutionally required to accord full
faith and credit to the judgment of the Texas court, notwithstanding
that the Texas judgment was then pending on appeal. Under Texas
law, 'a judgment is generally final for the purposes of issue and
claim preclusion regardless of the taking of an appeal.' Texas Beef
Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1996). Because the

Texas judgment was 'final' for purposes of claim and issue preclusion, the District Court of Tulsa County correctly predicated its decision thereon.18 0
However, the court went on to find that, notwithstanding the correctness of the Oklahoma court's ruling at the time it was rendered,
the judgment must be reversed.' 8 As a matter of first impression in
Oklahoma, the appellate court held that a second judgment predicated on a prior judgment later reversed cannot stand.182
The decision in the above case will be of great import in future interpleader actions in which the underlying dispute is being litigated in
the courts of another jurisdiction.
B. Court Finds that an Injunction was Warranted to Prevent the
Defendant from Disposing of the Funds in Dispute
During the Pendency of the Lawsuit
In Chesapeake Exploration,L. L. C. v. Rafter Ranch, L. L. C., Chesapeake sued Rafter for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.'8 3
Chesapeake alleged that it paid $1,269,665.00 to Rafter for an assignment of certain oil and gas leasehold rights, but that Rafter never ac175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id.
183. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Rafter Ranch, L.L.C., No. 108,219, 1 2
(Okla. Civ. App. Jan. 6, 2012) (Okla. Pub. Legal Research Sys.).
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quired the leasehold rights and never assigned them to Chesapeake.18 4
Rafter refused Chesapeake's demand to return the money.' 85 Chesapeake alleged that Rafter was spending the money on its operating
expenses (and that Rafter had already spent $439,912.67 of the
amount paid).""' Consequently, Chesapeake sought temporary and
permanent injunctions, or the imposition of a constructive trust, to
prevent Rafter from disposing of the remainder of the cash pending
the outcome of the litigation over Chesapeake's claims.'
Rafter admitted that it received the payment from Chesapeake but
denied that it was for an assignment of leasehold rights. 88 Rafter further denied that it had any duty to Chesapeake to acquire the
leases. 89
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Chesapeake the requested injunctive relief on the grounds that Chesapeake
had not presented evidence showing it would suffer irreparable harm
without the issuance of an injunction, and had not demonstrated a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.o90 Chesapeake appealed.' 9 '
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions to enter a temporary injunction barring Rafter from using or
spending the balance of the purchase money in its possession.' 92 The
court also found that the imposition of a constructive trust on any
remaining balance was warranted and should have been granted. 9 3
In reaching those rulings, the court of appeals held that the district
court erred because Chesapeake submitted uncontroverted evidence
(a) that it advanced purchase money to Rafter for the acquisition of
the subject leases and not for any other purpose, (b) that Rafter failed
to acquire the leases, (c) that Rafter was instead spending Chesapeake's purchase money on litigation against the owner of the subject
interests and had already spent $439,912.67 of the money, and (d) that
"Chesapeake would be irreparably harmed if Rafter was permitted
continued access to the fund."' 9 4
184.
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